Fund Report

VBF Class A

Second Quarter / 2007

Investidor Profissional
Desde 1988

Index

This is the first report on the VBF Class A of the IP Brazil Fund SPC (VBF), written 4 months after its inception. Despite the promising initial results, it is still too early to talk about performance, especially when we consider the fund's long-term objectives. Even so, this is an excellent opportunity to recall the reasoning behind the Fund's creation and the main concepts of its investment strategy.

As already mentioned in previous reports on other IP equity funds, we continue to see intense activity in the Brazilian capital market. The flow of companies accessing the capital market through IPOs remains strong. The new companies usually present good levels of corporate governance, but on the other hand they enter the market with high valuations and with their multiples much higher than their peers. Finding good investments with the necessary margin of safety has been a hard task when we study the recent IPOs.

The São Paulo Stock Exchange index remains in a rising trend: in 2007 alone the Ibovespa has recorded an appreciation of 35.73%[1]. This bull market has already lasted 4 years, with a cumulative return of 263.01%[1] since 2003.

When we created the VBF, our reasoning was that, in spite of all the agitation in the Brazilian capital market and the consequent rise in the prices of assets, we believed that it was possible to make good investments in Brazilian companies at attractive prices. Our opinion remains unchanged. One just has to know where to look.

Despite the moment of total optimism prevailing in the Brazilian economy, and consequently in Brazilian companies, it is possible to find quality companies that are suffering in the short term due to non-recurrent reasons. In this category, one can find everything from turn-around cases with great chances of success, such as Pão de Açúcar (PCAR4), to event-driven stories, such as the Telemar case (TMAR3 and TNLP3), in which – for reasons involving the shareholders – the company's shares have not been performing as well as expected. We take advantage and will continue taking advantage of this kind of opportunity, but this is not where the motivation to create the VBF came from.

After almost 20 years managing equity funds in Brazil, this is not the first time IP's investment team faces a heated market, where most assets are already well priced. With regard to this subject, we recall a paragraph from the September 1994 Fund report:

"In the continuous search for possibilities of high gains with low risk, which leads us to seek quality companies with good prospects and attractive prices, we are advancing towards low liquidity paper of smaller companies, usually ignored by the market".

We would not have created the VBF if we believed that the main investment opportunities would come from occasional cases of market overreaction. The VBF was created because, more and more, we believe that the major investment opportunities will be found in the category that we classify as PIPEs (Private Investments in Public Equities), and also in private equity.

Internally, we classify as PIPEs those investments whose main characteristic, besides the stock's low liquidity, is that we have a role as an "activist shareholder", within a collaborative approach by which we help the companies to maximize the fair value of their business and to win the market's recognition for their quality. Investment stories that have built IP's reputation in Brazil, such as Saraiva, Lojas Renner and Elevadores Atlas, fit into this category. At present, in the VBF's portfolio, the main example of a PIPE is the Fund's top holding, Globex, which is the second largest home appliance retailer in Brazil. Through the funds it manages, IP holds approximately 15% of the company's capital.

(1) in USD as of June, 29, 2007.

The VBF's by-laws stipulate that the fund can invest up to 15% of its net assets in private equity. Considering our long track record of investments in PIPEs in Brazil, we feel that investing in private equity is a natural extension of our expertise, coherent with our perception that the best investment opportunities are found in less obvious ideas and less liquid assets, which are more difficult to access.

The Brazilian stock exchange is far from reflecting the real economy. It is enough for one to walk along the streets of the main Brazilian capitals to find companies with a long history of activity, strong competitive positioning, consolidated brands and robust financial results, which for historical reasons never became interested in the Brazilian capital market. In this segment, it is possible to find good businesses operating far below their potential.

It is not everyone that can access this deal flow. In this respect, we count on the competitive advantage given by our reputation of a collaborative shareholder, built in the course of almost 20 years. This reputation enables IP to have greater access to entrepreneurs willing to admit a partner that has the necessary financial skills to lead the company from its present stage to a successful future IPO. From our point of view, this type of investment case is very similar to the PIPEs we have already undertaken and will continue to undertake.

In the first days of July, as we prepare this report, we are concluding the VBF's first investment in private equity. Further information will be presented in the next report, in September.

The VBF's life started in March of the current year, but the fund's investment stories, especially the PIPEs, have long been known to IP. Our experience in this type of investment reinforces our belief that, in the past and in the future, the success of investment stories is based on in-depth analysis, on the quality of the business, on the good choice of partners and on disciplined management, especially at times of euphoria or depression in the market.

The VBF closed the month of June with 65,9% of its portfolio invested in 14 companies. Below we present an update on the top 5 holdings that together represented 50,9% of the portfolio. We have also included an update on Dimed, a company that we have been following for a long time and that can become a larger position in the future.

GLOBEX

Name: Globex Utilidades SA	
Sector/Industry: Retail	
Ticker: GLBO3 / GLOB4	
Share Class: ON / PN	
Tag along: 80% ON	
Price*: R$39,50 / R$39,83	
Market Cap*: USD 2 Bn/ USD 2 Bn	

* As of June 29, 2007

Globex is one of Brazil's leading retailers. Through the Ponto Frio brand, it operates 369 stores at present, spread over the South-eastern, Southern and Central-western regions.

Although it operates in a difficult sector, in which many of the competitors have disappeared, Globex managed to pass unscathed through various negative situations, in the course of the last two decades. The conservative approach adopted in conducting its business has always called our attention in a positive way.

In addition, like every successful retailer, Globex has significant competitive advantages. First, the location of its stores. The company is present in the country's main economic centers, with excellent sales points that could hardly be replicated. Another determining factor is the quality of the Ponto Frio brand, which has been in operation for over 60 years and has great credibility among clients.

At the beginning of 2002, the company went through an undefined situation in terms of shareholder structure, which affected the way in which business was conducted. At that time, some competitors even took advantage of the situation in order to gain market share from the company.

In the course of 2004, the shareholder situation was settled, when a member of the controlling family took over the restructuring of the business. The Board of Directors was formed with the support of independent members, and some new executives were hired to take on important positions in the management.

Since then, the company has started its restructuring with the objective of having professional management and creating the right management structure. This process has not yet been concluded, which is still affecting the company's profitability and limiting its growth. In order to accelerate the restructuring process, a new executive (Manuel Amorim) was hired as the company's CEO – he has a well respected track record and a profile that seems to us to fit well into Globex's present phase.

We believe that the initiatives taken by the new management throughout the year will strengthen the business and allow the company to pursue the various opportunities for growth that exist.

Lately, we have significantly increased our Funds' participation in Globex. We believe that the first steps towards institutionalizing the company have been taken, with the hiring of professional executives and with independent members joining the Board of Directors.

There is no doubt that in order to complete this institutional advance and improve the company's Corporate Governance standards, the final objective should be to carry out an offering in a differentiated segment of Bovespa. This event would increase the liquidity of Globex's shares, which is very low at present, and would finally place it at the proper level of governance.

Because it is an extremely solid company, trading below its fair value and at a discount in relation to its listed competitors, we have been able to attain a high safety margin with Globex stock. In addition, we can see prospects of a high upside potential for the next few years, within a successful turn-around scenario and improved Corporate Governance.

Telemar

Name: Telemar Norte Leste	
Sector/Industry: Telecom	
Ticker: TNLP3	
Share Class: ON	
Tag along: 80%	
Price*: R$76,95	
Market Cap*: USD 15 Bn	

* As of June 29, 2007

Our investment in Telemar common shares is a subject that is well known to our regular readers. This is a clear case of misalignment between controlling shareholders and minority preferred shareholders, due to the absence of tag-along rights for preferred shares, the low stake that the controllers have in the company, and the controllers' motivation itself (there is no long-term strategic operator in the controlling block). This combination of factors creates a strong incentive for the controllers to charge a high control premium for their block, which would benefit our position in Telemar common shares (TNLP3).

We have held this position in IP Participações for over three years, since the time the common shares were traded at a discount in relation to the preferred shares. Despite the significant appreciation of our position during this period, and the premium the common shares incorporate at present in relation to the preferred shares, we still find the risk/return of the common shares attractive. We see an upside potential of over 25% in various scenarios – such as migration to the New Market at market prices, a sale to a strategic operator, or a merger with Brasil Telecom.

It seems inevitable that questions will be asked about the possible risks of the Telemar case at present. We believe there may be the risk of a small downside if the controllers are successful in the tender offer recently announced for Telemar preferred shares. The controllers are proposing to purchase Tele Norte Leste preferred shares (TNLP4) at R$35 and Telemar Norte Leste preferred shares (TMAR5) at R$52. The offer for Tele Norte Leste preferred shares (TNLP4) is conditional upon the acceptance of at least 2/3 of the free float. If it is successful, the controllers will end up having a greater economic interest in preferred shares (TNLP4) than in common shares (TNLP3). This could create an incentive to migrate to the New Market, valuing the common and preferred shares in equal conditions. In this case, we calculate a downside risk of about 15%.

In our assessment, the risk of success in the tender offer for Tele Norte Leste preferred shares (TNLP4) is low. Obtaining 2/3 of the free float seems complicated, due to the fragmented shareholder base. The price offered (R$35 for TNLP4) is also very low, valuing TNLP4 at only 3.5x EV/Ebitda. In addition, shareholders who think the controllers' next step will be to migrate to the New Market at an exchange ratio of 1x1 will probably opt not to sell their preferred shares, which further complicates the offer's chance of success.

Even so, even if the offer is successful, it does not seem obvious to us that the controllers will necessarily propose an exchange ratio beneficial to the preferred shares (1x1). The difference in the controllers' economic interest in common and preferred shares is not likely to be very significant, so the latter may not see any great benefit in proposing a transaction in conditions that are the exact opposite of those offered in 2006.

For all of the above-mentioned reasons, we think that, despite the control premium already incorporated in the prices, the risk/return of investing in Tele Norte Leste common shares (TNLP3) is still attractive.

Coteminas

Name: Cia Tecidos Norte de Minas – Coteminas	
Sector/Industry: Textile	
Ticker: CTNM4	
Share Class: PN	
Tag along: 80%	
Price*: R$307,46	
Market Cap*: USD 862 MM	

* As of June 29, 2007

Coteminas has proved to be a winner in a sector that is in full decline in Brazil: the textile industry. While its competitors went bankrupt, Coteminas' profits were multiplied by over 3.5 in the last 8 years. At present, the company is focused on becoming a winner also in the world textile sector, which is facing radical changes in its fundamental factors since the end of the Multifiber Agreement in 2005.

In October 2005, Coteminas joined forces with Springs US, a leader in textile products for the home in the USA, thus creating the largest company in the world in this segment, with a 7% market share. It should be stressed that the world market for home textiles is highly fragmented, with the second ranked holding only a 3% market share. The objective of the merger of the two companies is to combine Coteminas' competitive costs with Springs US's strong brands and distribution structure.

The company resulting from this merger, Springs Global (SG), is 3 times larger than Coteminas in net revenues. However, in this first phase, Coteminas opted to exchange high margins for scale. Coteminas' plants in Brazil used to achieve an EBITDA margin of 25% on average. The EBITDA margins of Springs US's plants were never above 6% – basically due to the very high labor costs, which are as much as 12 times higher than in Brazil. Coteminas' productivity is also much higher than Springs US's, considering that it owns the world's largest integrated plant for home textile goods. There is no plant as large and as highly integrated as Coteminas' in India, China or Pakistan – its main competitors. The largest Chinese company in the sector does not reach 10% of Springs Global's size, and the largest Indian competitor has only 40% of SG's capacity for towel production. (It should be observed that, in Asia, it is rare for a company to operate both in the towel and the bed-linen segments).

Coteminas is today a typical case of restructuring. At the moment, almost all of Springs US's plants are being transferred to Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. Until this process is concluded, in the fourth quarter of 2007, SG's EBITDA margin is likely to remain very low. In fact, in this 1Q07, SG booked one of its lowest margins: 2.7% (only US$13mm Ebitda). This may be compared to the 1Q06 margin, which was also very low at 5.7% (Ebitda of US$35mm). In view of the transfer of the plants, SG is clearly operating far below its capacity and still maintains high labor costs due to the US plants that have not yet been transferred. According to Coteminas' management, if all the plants had already been operating in Brazil from the very beginning of 2006, SG's EBITDA margin would have reached at least 12%. This effect alone would already raise the company's cash-flow from the US$97mm booked in 2006 to US$266mm.

Coteminas recently announced the beginning of SG's IPO process, which should be concluded before the end of July. The operation may reach US$ 400mm, of which US$230mm from a primary issue that is to be used to reduce SG's debt (currently at US$500mm). If SG is priced at 7x EV/Ebitda 2008 – a level that we consider very reasonable and that adopts a conservative assumption for the EBITDA margin (12% in 2008) – it means that Coteminas will be priced at R$330 per share. If the market is of the opinion that it is feasible to reach a 15% margin in 2008 (which we think is much more likely), or pays a slightly higher multiple (8x), Coteminas will be priced at R$400-430 per share – a price range we believe is more realistic, considering the fundamentals and prospects presented by SG.

Pão de Açúcar

Name: Grupo Pão de Açúcar SA	
Sector/Industry: Retail	
Ticker: PCAR4	
Share Class: PN	
Tag along: -	
Price*: R$75,40	
Market Cap*: USD 4 Bn	

* As of June 29, 2007

Pão de Açúcar, currently the second largest retailer in Brazil, has strong competitive advantages in relation to its competitors. With its large scale, it obtains greater benefits from suppliers. In addition, thanks to the several acquisitions effected in the course of the last ten years, the company has been able to obtain privileged locations in the two main cities in the country.

The leading position achieved in the nineties, during the sector's consolidation process, was a historic opportunity that was well used so as to generate advantages for the company. However, this leading position cost a lot in terms of profitability. The high premiums paid for the acquisitions, especially in the last few years, together with an unfavorable economic environment, had a negative effect on both the company's results and the shares in the market.

At that time, the lack of tag-along rights for Pão de Açúcar shares was a highly negative fact. This lack ended up contributing to the aggressive posture of the controlling shareholder, because it permitted an accumulation of strategic value in detriment to the minority shareholders. In practice, the acquisitions were expensive for the company but cheap for the controlling shareholder, who could sell his shares at a premium in relation to the market value.

Although the situation was not very encouraging from the point of view of a potential investment, we continued following the company's results all these years. In the second semester of 2005, a transaction was announced in which the controlling shareholder sold part of his stake in the company to a strategic investor, realizing most of the control premium he was entitled to. After the transaction, the controlling shareholder's remaining stake was linked to the price of the preferred shares in the market, thus finally aligning the interests of all shareholders.

We believe that after the transaction the risk of an uncontrolled quest for growth through buying other chains with valuations above their fair value has diminished considerably. Another positive factor is the present stage of the retail sector in Brazil, in which most of the consolidation in the food sector has already taken place. The company has reached sufficient scale to face any competitor, and there are no large chains left to be acquired.

This shareholder transaction and the present situation regarding the sector's consolidation have changed our view in relation to Pão de Açúcar. These two events have also changed the company's posture. The strategy at the moment is to grow organically, with greater focus on productivity and cost control. The rapid growth that occurred during the acquisition period in the past had a negative effect on the efficiency of the business. The objective now is to increase the return on existing assets. The executives have already taken several measures and the results should appear in the course of time. We believe that potential opportunities are huge.

Even with all the progress achieved, the stock price has not accompanied the recent market appreciation. During 2006, sales were weak and below market expectations. We do not believe that this fall is a structural movement. Several different factors affect sales, making it difficult to foresee the exact moment when sales will pick up.

The most important thing, in our opinion, is that the company continues to gain market share from its main competitors and to adopt correct strategies to generate value in the long term. As we believe that the fall in sales has little effect on the company's value, we took the chance at the end of last year and beginning of the current year to increase our position.

MARCOPOLO

Name: Marcopolo SA	
Sector/Industry: Auto and Components	
Ticker: POMO4	
Share Class: PN	
Tag along: 70%	
Price*: R$7,49	
Market Cap*: USD 853 MM	

* As of June 29, 2007

The leader in the Brazilian bus bodywork market, Marcopolo is recognized in the sector for its production technology. This makes it attractive to international partners, keen to join forces with the company in order to bring better products to their markets.

In Russia and India, for example, Marcopolo is starting up two joint ventures with the leading producers of each country. The model of these JVs is simple: Marcopolo contributes its production know-how while the partners bring in the clients. At present, Marcopolo's two partners have market shares of over 50% in their markets. (Together, the Indian and Russian markets have a demand of about 90,000 buses per year, as against 15,000 in the Brazilian market). Profits are shared under an initial 10-year contract. After this period, depending on the success of the enterprise and the quality of the relationship created, the contracts may be extended.

Vision and strategic agility are among Marcopolo's outstanding qualities. After suffering from the exchange-rate appreciation in 2005, the company changed its growth model, which was previously based on exports from Brazil, to a model of production partnerships in key markets. When it recognized that the exchange-rate appreciation might not be temporary, it opted to react, rather than demand government intervention. It became more aggressive in cutting costs and intensified its investments outside the country, with an expansion project for its plant in Colombia and partnerships in India and Russia. At present, other investments, partnerships and even acquisitions are included in the company's plans. With this strategy, Marcopolo seeks to sustain its global competitiveness in bus production, independently of the local exchange rate.

However, Marcopolo's opportunities for growth are not restricted to the foreign market. In Brazil, conditions are good for investments in renewing bus fleets. With BNDES financing and an environment of economic stability, the owners of such fleets are more confident to invest. In addition, a recently launched federal program for school transport has the potential to introduce strong additional demand for the company's Volare line.

In the current year, Marcopolo is going through a good phase. According to data released by the company, cumulative revenues from January to May 2007 were 15.6% higher than those booked in the same period of 2006. The production volume, which was reduced at the beginning of the year due to collective holidays at chassis producers, is recovering rapidly.

Adopting conservative assumptions, we believe that the present stock price only reflects Marcopolo's already established business, and takes into account little of the value to be generated by the joint ventures in India and Russia. Also recognizing the company's proven capacity to capture new growth opportunities, the investment in its stock seems to us an excellent alternative.

Dimed

Name:	Dimed SA Distribuidora de Medicamentos
Sector/Industry:	Pharmaceutical
Ticker:	PNVL3 / PNVL4
Share Class:	ON / PN
Tag along:	80% ON
Price*:	R$73,48 / R$62,00
Market Cap*:	USD 146 MM / USD 127 MM

* As of June 29, 2007

The only company in the country to operate both in the distribution of drugs and in the field of pharmacies (through the Panvel brand), Dimed has been booking profitable growth of 12% p.a. in the last three years. It may be observed that this growth is even more significant if certain characteristics of the sector are taken into account, such as the predominance of merchants who evade taxes and the high sensitivity to income fluctuations.

Operating only in the country's Southern region, fairly modestly as yet in the distribution of drugs in the State of Paraná and, in the pharmacy segment, only in the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, Dimed grows by reinventing its business: not only was it the country's pioneer in creating its own brand in the hygiene and beauty care segment, but it is also considered to have achieved the best execution of this kind of initiative in the sector. Its own brand has a better margin and attracts the public, which eventually becomes loyal to the brand.

With approximately 230 stores in the States of RS and SC, Panvel is the sixth largest drugstore chain in the country. The distributor, Dimed, is also among the 10 largest in the country. It is important to stress that in Brazil both the drug distribution sector and the drugstore sector are highly fragmented. In the distribution area, three companies concentrate less than 30% of the market; and in the retail area, the five largest companies have less than 20% of a market in which almost 60% of the companies are so-called "independents" (they are not chains of stores).

Both Dimed and Panvel own valuable assets that have high regional market shares (between 10% and 15% in RS and SC).

We believe that the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector (distribution and retail segments) will go through an even faster expansion phase than that observed in the last few years, due to:

- Consolidation: Profarma, the 3rd largest distributor in the country, carried out its IPO in October 2006, raising R$310mm. Drogasil, the 4th largest drugstore chain in the country, raised R$200mm in the stock market during the last week in June. The financial reinforcement of these groups should significantly accelerate their capacity to expand, both organically and through acquisitions.
- Favorable demographic evolution: the population above the age of 60 will register much higher growth than the population in general (3.4% p.a. in the next 20 years vs. 1.8% p.a. for the population in general).
- Great pent-up demand for drugs: statistics show that 50% of the population hardly have access to drugs. The richer 15% of the population have accounted for over half of the total sales of drugs. With the recovery of real growth in the income of the Brazilian population, drug consumption should become stronger.

Dimed is trading today at 9.3x EV/Ebitda 08, compared to a multiple of 10x for Profarma and approximately 16x for Drogasil.

IP, through its investment funds, has been an important shareholder of Dimed for over 10 years. We have been working with the management in order to accelerate the company's growth and increase the market's recognition of its value.

	VBF Class A	Performance (US$)		
	% Invested Equities	VBF Class A	Ibovespa	MSCI EM
June 07	68.36%	3.12%	3.71%	4.73%
May 07	64.13%	9.04%	12.47%	4.98%
April 07	54.76%	5.75%	9.04%	4.64%
March 07 (1)	30.36%	1.64%	10.42%	7.69%
2007 (YTD)	-	20.86%	40.44%	23.90%
Since inception (1)	-	20.86%	40.44%	23.90%

(1) 2007, Mar 06

NAV per Share as of June, 29, 2007: USD 120,85625949

NAV as of June, 29, 2007: USD 76.234.746,36

EQUITY HOLDING CHARACTERISTICS*



* PIPE: Private Investment in Public Equity/Tag Along: % with tag along rights/Ibovespa: % in the index/ Capitalization: small (smaller than US$1b), Mid (between US$1b and US$3b), Large (larger than US$3b)

STRUCTURE

IP Brazil Fund SPC, VBF Segregated Portfolio is an exempted company registered as a segregated portfolio company, incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Law of August 3, 2006 of the Cayman Islands.

Investment Manager: Investidor Profissional Gestão de Recursos Ltda.
Net Asset Value Calculator: Mellon Serviços Financeiros DTVM S.A.
Brazilian Custodian: Banco Bradesco S.A
Bank: UBS AG, Stamford Branch, CT (USA)
Registrar and Transfer Agent: UBS Fund Services (Cayman) Ltd.
Auditor: KPMG
Inception Date of Classs A: March 06, 2007

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Subscription: On scheduled rounds. Closing day of the first round was March, 2007.

Next Round: Expected for the third quarter of 2007

Minimum Initial Investment: USD 1,000,000.00

PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION



Portfolio Multiples*	2007E	2008E
Price/Earnings	19.08	13.85
Price/Book	2.83	2.58
Enterprise Value / EBITDA	8.89	7.29
Return on Equity	15%	18%
Dividend Yield	3.3%	4.2%

* Estimate by IP

TERMS AND CONDITIONS (CONT.)

Redemption: Lock-up Period of 18 months. Redemption dates on the last Business Day of each calendar quarter, with a three months prior notice.

Maximum Redemption: Limit of 10% of the issued shares of the class in each quarter of the first five years after the lock-up period and 15% thereafter.

Management Fees: (i) 1.0% per annum of the Net Asset Value of the VBF Segregated Portfolio allocated to fixed income investments, including but not limited to cash, and (ii) 2.0% per annum of the Net Asset Value of the VBF Segregated Portfolio allocated to the remaining Investments.
Any Management Fee and Incentive Fee payable in respect of any Class S Shares representing Designated Investments will not be paid until the realization or deemed realization of the Designated Investments.

Incentive Fees:

- 20% computed on returns in excess of IPCA+9%, with catch-up mechanism:
  – between IPCA+9% and IPCA+10% p.a.: 100%
  – above IPCA+10% p.a.: 20%
  note: IPCA is the Brazilian Broad Consumer Price Index
- High-water-mark mechanism avoiding double charging for same performance
- Accrued daily and paid semi-annually

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

For additional information regarding of VBF, please contact us by phone at (55 21) 2104-0506 or by e-mail at contactus@investidorprofissional.com

Miscellaneous

"At the beginning of January, after we announced that December sales had fallen by 1%, the stock price fell drastically. In just a few days, we lost over US$ 300 million in market capitalization, despite the announcement of a drop in sales of only US$ 5 million. Three months later, the stock rose to its historical peak. Sales went back to their previous level (...) What had changed? Once again, nothing substantial. Starbucks was the same company in April and January. The difference is that the market simply decided that the company was worth more. (...) At a given moment, you should divorce yourself from the daily evolution of the stock and concentrate on the business " – Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks Coffee

"If *I could avoid a single stock, it would be the hottest stock in the hottest industry, the one that gets the most favourable publicity, the one that every investor hears about in the car pool or on the commuter train – and succumbing to the social pressure, often buys"* – Peter Lynch

About the diversification of assets in stock portfolios: "To suggest that you should sell part of your positions in successful companies simply because it represents an important part of an investment portfolio is the same thing as declaring that the Chicago Bulls should sell Michael Jordan because he is very important to the team" – Warren Buffett

"There is no doubt that there are far more "investment professionals" and way more IQ in the field, as it didn't use to look that promising. Investment data are available more conveniently and faster today. But the behavior of investors will not be more intelligent than in the past, despite all this. How people react will not change – their psychological makeup stays constant. You need to divorce your mind from the crowd. The herd mentality causes all these IQ's to become paralyzed. I don't think investors are now acting more intelligently, despite the intelligence. Smart doesn't always equal rational. To be a successful investor you must divorce yourself from the fears and greed of the people around you, although it is almost impossible." – Warren Buffett

INVESTIDOR PROFISSIONAL
DESDE 1988

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